Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State – Europe and the Habermas-Ratzinger Debate by Jiménez Lobeira, Pablo Cristóbal
 Pre-political Foundations of the 
Democratic Constitutional State – 
Europe and the 
Habermas-Ratzinger Debate 
Pablo Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira​1 
 
Abstract: ​In 2004 Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger participated                 
in a debate on the ‘pre-political moral foundations of the free-state’.                     
Their contributions showed broad agreement on the role of religion in                     
today’s Western secular state and on areas of collaboration and mutual                     
enrichment between Modernity and Christianity in Europe and the                 
West. They diverged regarding the need or not of a common cultural                       
background prior to the existence of the polity. Their diverging point                     
becomes all the more fascinating to the extent that the matter requires                       
wider empirical, analytical and normative research before it can be                   
settled. Nevertheless, the implications that derive from one or the other                     
possibility are very different in terms, for instance, of immigration and                     
citizenship policies. This is already clear in Europe and is becoming                     
more evident in general in Western democracies. 
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In January 2004 two prominent European intellectuals met for a discussion on                       
the moral foundations of the constitutional state. One from the west (Düsseldorf,                       
North-Rhine-Westphalia) and the other from the south (Marktl am Inn, Bavaria)                     
of Germany, they both were born in the twenties and received their doctoral                         
degrees in the sixties. Both have been leading thinkers in their respective fields.                         
One of them represents the values of Enlightenment and secularism. The other                       
one has been considered an icon of Christianity and religion. 
The encounter has not been the only one either of them has had with thinkers of                               
very contrasting extractions. Habermas was going to hold similar discussions                   
with members of the Jesuit School of Philosophy in Münich. Ratzinger did                       
likewise with Italian atheists Paolo Flores and Marcello Pera. Books would follow                       
from each of those events (Habermas et al. 2010, Ratzinger & Flores d’Arcais                         
2009, Ratzinger & Pera 2006). As one could expect, strong contrasts appear                       
between Habermas and Ratzinger. But surprisingly, they have coincidences and                   
agreements too. 
For Habermas, the democratic constitutional state is self sufficient in terms of                       
the normative justification for its existence. It does not require more pre-political                       
foundations than the legitimacy that its democratic constitution intrinsically                 
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engenders. Its foundations are post-metaphysical. 
In his perspective, what the state cannot generate through laws is the solidarity                         
essential for its political life, for the participation of citizens in the making of                           
laws and discussion of the common good of that society. The millenary religious                         
traditions can be very useful to cover that lack. Yet in order to have those                             
benefits potentially present in religions, the state must become neuter, and                     
secularists should realise they are living in a post-secular age. Religious                     
worldviews ought not to be discarded a priori as irrational, and secularism                       
should be acknowledged as one more among different worldviews, giving way to                       
a constructive dialog between secularists and believers. 
For Ratzinger, the last fifty years have provided eloquent examples of laws that                         
can be unjust, even when approved by overwhelming majorities. This opens the                       
question – exemplified in the existence of a more or less widely accepted set of                             
human rights – of whether legality is a synonym of legitimacy. And if laws – even                               
democratic ones – are not the standard of justice, what is that standard, and who                             
can give it? 
According to him, religion has in the past been the pretext for wars and divisions                             
in Europe, and in its fundamentalist forms is a motivation or at least an                           
argument for terrorism today. On the other hand, enlightened, scientific reason                     
has shown capacity not only for good, but also for new forms of destruction                           
(atomic bombs) and manipulation of human beings (eugenics). 
Both facts, he concludes, seem to indicate that religion and secularism, which in                         
the case of the Enlightenment and Christianity share to a certain extent some                         
common rationality and can work to balance and purify each other from their                         
excesses. Christianity and Enlightenment could show, through a constructive                 
relationship, the way of a process that other (non-‘Western’ – European)                     
traditions (Islamic, Hindi, Chinese) might carry out in a similarly constructive                     
manner with their respective forms of secularism (provided they have them). In                       
this way the values and norms sensed by all human beings will eventually                         
become more clearly recognised and used effectively in the world. Let us first                         
delineate the problem both thinkers are trying to address. 
The problem of the normative foundations 
This was the central question of the debate: Is the political culture that allows the                             
Western democratic constitutional state to work successfully, based on a moral                     
background that is presupposed (and not explicitly acknowledged)? Jewish                 
Professor of Law Joseph HH Weiler (not present in the debate) affirms: 
One possible explanation for the success of what used to be called “Western                         
Liberal Democracy'' is precisely the Judaeo-Christian tradition, which               
persists in three ways…: one… Christianity taught us restraint in the                     
relationship between Church and State as part of its religious                   
self-understanding. “Render unto Caesar what is due to Caesar, render unto                     
God what is due to God.” It may never claim the control over all aspects of                               
life. It might have to say something about all aspects of life, but it                           
acknowledges that there is a realm of politics where the Church may make                         
demands, but does not pretend to rule. This is a discipline of self- restraint.                           
The second one is more profound: The Judea-Christian tradition teaches                   
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 self-restraint in our own exercise of our liberties. We are free to do many                           
things, but we don’t simply follow all our desires without restraint. We                       
control our liberty in order to be truly free, which spills over into politics.                           
Our political culture is a culture of self-restraint in the exercise of power,                         
which – as even an atheist or agnostic would acknowledge – we owe to the                             
Judeo-Christian tradition. Thirdly – and perhaps here the Judaic tradition has                     
contributed even more than the Christian one – we uphold the idea of the                           
rule of law. There is no democracy without the rule of law. This is the key to                                 
success (Weiler 2006). 
Does this mean that Judeo-Christianity is the only or the best possible moral                         
foundation for the political culture of an achieving liberal democracy, in contrast                       
with other metaphysical traditions? Or that Judeo-Christianity happens to be the                     
religious tradition of Europe and ‘the West’ and, because of that, it has worked                           
well as the moral foundation for its democracies, but that successful liberal                       
democracies could exist as well over different cultural backgrounds (Islam or                     
Buddhism for instance)? 
This paper seeks to answer neither of those questions​2 ​that are in good part                           
empirical​3​. It does have two goals in engaging with the contents of the debate:                           
first, to advance in the analytical clarification of the problem; second, to                       
enunciate some of the most important normative implications: if certain moral                     
foundations are essential to a successful constitutional democracy, then those                   
foundations ought to be kept and cherished not only in their intrinsic value for                           
those citizens who hold them, but also due to their instrumental value as a                           
source of cohesion and pre-political reference for the whole polity. Let us go                         
through the contributions in the order in which they were made during the                         
debate. 
A procedural foundation or ​sola ratio 
For Habermas the very doubt about the possibility of the constitutional                     
democracy to renew from its own sources the normative presuppositions of its                       
existence would be indeed ‘an embarrassment to a state that was committed to                         
neutrality in terms of its world view’, following ‘what Rawls has called “the fact                           
of pluralism”’ (Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:21). 
He admits that such consequence is not per se an argument against the existence                           
of moral pre-political foundations, and passes to analyse the question from his                       
Kantian, republican perspective​4​. He considers that Europe is entering into a                     
‘post-secular’ age – one of revival (or survival) of religion in ‘secular’ Europe                         
(Casanova 2008). In Habermas’ own words, 
(…) it is in the interest of the constitutional state to deal carefully with all the                               
cultural sources that nourish its citizens’ consciousness of norms and their                     
solidarity. This awareness…is reflected in the phrase: “postsecular               
society”…[and] refers not only to the fact that religion is holding its own in                           
an increasingly secular environment and that society must assume that                   
religious fellowships will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. The                     
expression “postsecular” does more than give public recognition to religious                   
fellowships in view of the functional contribution they make to the                     
reproduction of motivations and attitudes that are societally desirable. The                   
public awareness of a post-secular society also reflects a normative insight                     
that has consequences for the political dealings of unbelieving citizens with                     
believing citizens. In the postsecular society, there is an increasing consensus                     
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that certain phases of the “modernization of the public consciousness”                   
involve the assimilation and the reflexive transformation of both religious                   
and secular mentalities (Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:46-7). 
The state should acknowledge this fact for two reasons. First, so that the process                           
of deliberation that brings about laws and debate in the public sphere will be                           
legitimate and accepted by all. Second, because beyond formalities religious                   
traditions might actually have something sensible to say regarding issues that                     
concern the polity: ‘philosophy has good reasons to be willing to learn from                         
religious traditions’ (Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:42), 
(…) not only for functional reasons, but also…for substantial reasons. This is                       
because the mutual compenetration of Christianity and Greek metaphysics                 
not only produced the intellectual form of theological dogmatics and                   
hellenization of Christianity…[but] also promoted the assimilation by               
philosophy of genuinely Christian ideas. This work of assimilation has left its                       
mark in normative conceptual clusters with a heavy weight of meaning, such                       
as responsibility, autonomy, and justification; or history and remembering,                 
new beginning, innovation, and return; or emancipation and fulfillment; or                   
expropriation, internalization, and embodiment, individuality and           
fellowship (Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:44). 
An outstanding example is the concept, so enrooted in Western mentality, of                       
human dignity and equality: 
Philosophy has indeed transformed the original religious meaning of these                   
terms, but without emptying them through a process of deflation and                     
exhaustion. One such translation that salvages the substance of a term is the                         
translation of the concept of “man in the image of God” into that of the                             
identical dignity of all men that deserves unconditional respect. This goes                     
beyond the borders of one particular religious fellowship and makes the                     
substance of biblical concepts accessible to a general public that also                     
includes those who have other faiths or who have none (Habermas &                       
Ratzinger 2006:44-45). 
Habermas does not have any problem in acknowledging an important role for                       
religion in the democratic constitutional state. As a secularist, he is moderate                       
enough to differentiate between the political language which the polity uses to                       
work (internal decision-making processes and policies) and the secular                 
worldview which, as such, is comparable with the worldviews of other cultures                       
and with religions: 
The neutrality of the state authority on questions of world views guaranties                       
the same ethical freedom for every citizen. This is incompatible with the                       
political universalization of a secularist world view. When secularized                 
citizens act in their role as citizens of the state, they must not deny in                             
principle that religious images of the world have the potential to express                       
truth. Nor must they refuse their believing fellow citizens the right to make                         
contributions in a religious language to public debates. Indeed, a liberal                     
political culture can expect that the secularized citizens play their part in the                         
endeavors to translate relevant contributions from the religious language                 
into a language that is accessible to the public as a whole (Habermas &                           
Ratzinger 2006:51-52). 
But, does that mean that for Habermas a pre-political moral foundation, some                       
cultural homogeneity in other terms, is required for the constitutional state to                       
emerge? In his intervention, he dedicates the first part to explain why such                         
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 moral foundation is not necessary, and the rest (four sections) to speak about the                           
relation between secularism and religion in the state assuming it already exists                       
and enjoys legitimacy and consistency on its own, without need of pre-political                       
conditions. In his view, 
(…)“weak” suppositions about the normative contents of the communicative                 
constitution of socio-cultural forms of life suffice to defend a non-decisionist                     
concept of the validity of law both against the contextualism of a                       
non-defeatist concept of reason and against legal positivism (Habermas &                   
Ratzinger 2006:25). 
In other words, ‘the constitution of the liberal state can satisfy its own need for                             
legitimacy in a self-sufficient manner, that is, on the basis of the cognitive                         
elements of a stock of arguments that are independent of religions and                       
metaphysical traditions’ (Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:29). The aspect in which                   
the constitutional state is not sufficient is that of motivation for citizens to be                           
solidary to one another and to exercise other political virtues as for example                         
active participation in the public sphere and voting​5​. 
Habermas understands the foundations of the liberal state in a ‘proceduralist’                     
manner. He places his own position – ‘deliberative democracy’ – between                     
liberalism and republicanism (Habermas 2006b:411). According to his               
understanding, inspired in Kant (as opposed to the Hegelian view of law), ‘the                         
basic principles of the constitution have an autonomous justification’, rationally                   
acceptable by all citizens (Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:28). 
If the democratic process is inclusive of all citizens who – through discourse –                           
express their opinions and engage in dialogue until they reach agreements, the                       
results of that process will be rationally acceptable to all. At the same time, in                             
order to be valid, the process must include the granting of basic liberal and                           
political rights to all the members of the political community. The citizens,                       
gathered in deliberation, give themselves a constitution, from which state                   
authority emanates and which is subjected to the rule of law as its most inner                             
core. Political power is totally permeated by the law. In the constitutional sate                         
‘there is no ruling authority derived from something antecedent to the law’ such                         
as religion or some other fundament of its validity (Habermas & Ratzinger                       
2006:26-7). Systems of law 
…can be legitimated only in a self-referencial manner, that is, on the basis of                           
legal procedures born of democratic procedures… If one sees them as a                       
method whereby legitimacy is generated by legality, there is no “deficit of                       
validity” that would need to be filled by the ethical dimension (Habermas &                         
Ratzinger 2006:27-8). 
Though ‘Christian theology’ of ‘the Middle Ages’ and ‘especially’ the ‘late Spanish                       
Scholasticism’ are present in the genealogy of human rights, 
…[u]ltimately, however, the bases of legitimation of a state authority with a                       
neutral world view are derived from the profane sources of the philosophy                       
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was only at a much later date                           
that theology and the Church tackled the challenges of the revolutionary                     
constitutional state. Nevertheless, if I have understood it correctly, the                   
Catholic tradition, which is comfortable with the ​lumen naturale, ​has no                     
problem in principle with an autonomous justification of morality and law                     
(that is, a justification independent of the truths of revelation) [Habermas &                       
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Ratzinger 2006:24-5]. 
Thus the democratic constitutional state is self-sufficient or autonomous in terms                     
of its justification. If a tradition had to be invoked as the basis for its                             
understanding that would be mainly the Enlightenment (and only remotely                   
Christianity). But that is only a question of sources, not of intrinsic requirements                         
for a democratic constitutional state to exist and be legitimate. 
What then becomes of Weiler’s assertion that the success of ‘Western liberal                       
democracies’ is owed in part to the moral substrate of Judeo-Christianity in                       
them? Habermas seems to imply that no such tradition is necessary. Arguably, a                         
political community with members of any cultural background could build a                     
successful constitutional democracy, as long as they follow the procedures of                     
discourse and deliberation. 
This opens the possibility to create cosmopolitan, post-metaphysical, even                 
‘post-national’ states (a possible reading of European Union) where differences                   
in worldviews are transcended and the political culture relies only on clear legal                         
and discursive procedures. We will come back to this. First, though, let us turn to                             
the other contribution to the debate. 
A moral foundation, or ​fides et ratio 
Ratzinger is not completely sure that a good procedure will suffice to ground a                           
constitutional state. For him, politics must apply the criterion of the law to                         
power, so that not the law of the stronger, but the strength of the law will hold                                 
sway. But applying the criterion of the law to power leads to a further question: 
How does law come into being, and what must be the characteristics of law if                             
it is to be the vehicle of justice rather than the privilege of those who have                               
the power to make this law? It is, on the one hand, the question of the                               
genesis of the law, but, on the other hand, the question of its own inherent                             
criteria. The problem that law must be, not the instrument of the power of a                             
few, but the expression of the common interest of all, seems – at first sight –                               
to have been resolved through the instruments whereby a democratic will is                       
formed in society, since all collaborate in the genesis of the law. This means                           
that it is everyone’s law. And as a sheer matter of fact, the guarantee of a                               
shared collaboration in the elaboration of the law and in the just                       
administration of power is the basic argument that speaks in favour of                       
democracy as ​the most appropriate form of political order (Habermas &                    
Ratzinger 2006:58-59). 
So far Ratzinger has followed the essential traits of Habermas’ argument. But the                         
problem is not solved: 
And yet it seems to me that one question remains unanswered. Since total                         
consensus among men is very hard to achieve, the process of forming a                         
democratic will relies necessarily either on an act of delegation or else on a                           
majority decision… But majorities, too, can be blind or unjust, as history                       
teaches very plainly. When a majority (even if it is an utterly preponderant                         
majority oppresses a religious or a racial minority by means of unjust laws,                         
can we still speak in this instance of justice or, indeed, of law? (Habermas &                             
Ratzinger 2006:59-60). 
There are indeed numerous examples in recent European history of laws and                       
representatives that were approved democratically and held dubious ethical                 
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 standards​6​. So what is Ratzinger suggesting? 
In other words, the majority principle always leaves open the question of the                         
ethical foundations of the law. This is the question of whether there is                         
something that can never become law but always remains injustice; or, to                       
reverse this formulation, whether there is something that is of its very                       
nature inalienably law, something that is antecedent to every majority                   
decision and must be respected by all such decisions. The modern period has                         
formulated a number of such normative elements in the various declarations                     
of human rights and has withdrawn these from subjection to the vagaries of                         
majorities. It is of course possible for the contemporary consciousness to be                       
content with the inherent obviousness of these values… [which is, however,]                     
by no means acknowledged in every culture. Islam has defined its own                       
catalogue of human rights, which differs from the Western catalogue… And                     
if my information is correct,…today’s China…is asking whether “human                 
rights” are merely a typically Western invention – and one that must be                         
looked at critically (Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:60-61). 
He therefore points out to a moral foundation that precedes the law and that                           
serves as criteria so that the law will always be just: 
There are then, let us say, self-subsistent values that flow from the essence of                           
what it is to be a man, and are therefore inviolable: no other man can                             
infringe them… ​human rights… ​are incomprehensible without the               
presupposition that man ​qua ​man, thanks simply to his membership in the                       
species “man”, is the subject of rights and that his being bears within itself                           
values and norms that must be discovered – but not invented. Today, we                         
ought perhaps to amplify the doctrine of human rights with a doctrine of                         
human obligations and of human limitations. This could help us grasp anew                       
the relevance of the question of whether there might exist a rationality of                         
nature and, hence, a rational law for man and for his existence in the world.                             
And this dialogue would necessarily be intercultural today, both in its                     
structure and in its interpretation (Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:61, 71-72). 
Why does that dialogue have to be ‘intercultural’ and not only Enlightened and                         
Christian, since those two are ‘the two great cultures of the West’ which, each in                             
its own way, have influenced the whole world? Because if it true that they claim                             
to be de iure universal, de facto they are not (Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:75).                           
Western concepts of human rights, rule of law, separation of church and state,                         
and others, have been born in specific cultural contexts that must be                       
acknowledged and cannot be automatically reproduced in the whole of mankind                     
(Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:76). 
To be sure, Ratzinger finds himself ‘in broad agreement’ with Habermas ‘about                       
the post-secular society, about the willingness to learn from each other, and                       
about the self-limitation on both sides’ – secular and religious rationalities. He                       
speaks of ‘pathologies in religion’ which are extremely dangerous (terrorism, for                     
example, often justified on religious grounds) and that make it necessary to see                         
‘the divine light or reason as a “controlling organ”’ (Habermas & Ratzinger                       
2006:77). Religion ‘must continually allow itself to be purified and structured by                       
reason’ (ibid). 
At the same time, there are also ‘pathologies of reason’ with a hybris that is no                               
less dangerous (atomic bombs and eugenics are also products of reason).                     
Therefore ‘reason, too, must be warned to keep within its proper limits, and it                           
must learn a willingness to listen to the great religious traditions in mankind’                         
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(Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:78). Reason and faith, secularism and religion need                     
each other to keep each other in balance, so to speak. In a global context: 
There can be no doubt that the two main partners in this mutual relatedness                           
are the Christian faith and Western secular rationality; one can and must                       
affirm this, without thereby succumbing to a false Eurocentrism. These two                     
determine the situation of the world to an extent not matched by another                         
cultural force; but this does not mean that one could dismiss the other                         
cultures as a kind of ​quantité négligeable. ​For a western hubris of that kind,                           
there would be a high price to pay – and, indeed, we are already paying a                               
part of it… It is important to include the other cultures in the attempt at a                               
polyphonic relatedness, in which they themselves are receptive to the                   
essential complementarity of reason and faith, so that a universal process of                       
purifications (in the plural!) can proceed (Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:79).  
He therefore is aware of the cultural diversity that is an evident fact, of all                             
places, in today’s Europe. At the same time he maintains that Europe and the                           
West have at their cultural core both the Christian faith and the rationality of the                             
Enlightenment. 
The normative foundations of the European polity 
The two visions are, in many ways, compatible with each other. Departing from                         
different perspectives they reach common ground regarding the relations                 
between secularism and religion. They differ, however, regarding the normative                   
foundations of liberal democracies. 
It becomes obvious how secular rationality and religious faith can ‘purify’,                     
enrich and keep each other in balance within constituted states: religion accepts                       
a secular political order, in which, however, it can aspire to be heard in the                             
public sphere regarding visions of the common good, for example, as long as it                           
translates its discourse into a language that everybody can understand.                   
Secularism accepts that a ‘neutral state’ means an agnostic state, uncommitted to                       
any worldview, which is not the same as ‘anti-religious’: at least some forms of                           
secularism (laïcité) contain or can become themselves another worldview – and                     
when that happens, it has no right to place itself above other, alternative                         
worldviews (including those of religious traditions). 
In their debate, both Habermas and Ratzinger attempt a theoretical analysis that                       
as such overcomes contextual limitations. It is undeniable, however, that at the                       
same time they move in a certain implicit (and sometimes explicit) background                       
when they discuss the relations between secularism and religion. Both have as a                         
reference, in the first place, the common Vaterland, inside which examples of the                         
‘pathologies’ either of religion or reason have happened at different points in                       
history. 
A second contextual circle is, if my reading is correct, ‘Europe’ (the European                         
Union and surroundings). Europe has been the main arena of ‘secularisation’                     
first, and of ‘post-secularisation’ later: of Christianity and post-Christianity,                 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment. Europe is today, as well, a place of                     
cultural encounters brought about by the advent of massive immigration and the                       
revival of the fastest growing religion in that region of the world: Islam. An                           
encounter that has created new questions and challenges – empirical and                     
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 theoretical – to Europe’s former self-understanding as Christian, Modern – or                     
both. 
Such an experiment is being watched by the rest of ‘the West’ – that extension of                               
cultural Europe present today in the United States, Canada, Australia and other                       
countries outside geographical Europe. This is the third contextual circle.  
The fourth would be the world, progressively more interconnected thanks to the                       
development of globalisation. After all, Modernity and Christianity have                 
expanded well beyond Europe. 
So it may not be out of place to bring our problem (that of the normative                               
foundations of the democratic constitutional state) to the context of the                     
European project. The European Union is today a ‘polity of sorts’, analogical to                         
constituted democracies (Jiménez 2010a): an impossible project for some, an                   
uncompleted project for others, and still for others a new kind of polity. 
The idea of elaborating a ‘Constitution for Europe’ (or constitutional treaty) was                       
in part oriented to ‘solve’ such indeterminacy, tackle an increasing perception                     
that the project lacked legitimacy, and find or create a citizens’ feeling of                         
belonging with the Union. That attempt however opened the Pandora’s box of                       
‘European identity’, with a sharp debate around the Preamble (which in the                       
cases of many constitutions makes references to the normative foundations of a                       
polity, most constitutions of the EU member states included, Weiler 2003:53-84).                     
What was the source of commonality for Europeans? Christianity and the                     
Enlightenment?, a deliberative public sphere?, their ‘social model’?, their                 
international image as a ‘normative power’?, or a cosmopolitan openness to                     
diversity? (Jiménez 2010b). 
For all the heated debate about the Preamble, the question was not resolved.                         
Rather the Constitution was rejected no less than in pro-European, founding                     
members, France and the Netherlands. What did became clear is that Europe as                         
a polity is finding it hard to find or acknowledge its identity. And that such                             
‘identity crisis’ comes to the surface in the presence of the strong cultural force                           
of Islam. That, at least, is Caldwell’s (2009) thesis. If the cultural crisis of Europe                             
springs to the surface before problems like immigration and refugee policy,                     
criteria for expansion (especially to Turkey), integration of ‘culturally diverse’                   
citizens and residents, and resurgence of far-right parties in countries which up                       
to recently were famous for their openness and tolerance (the Netherlands for                       
example), Caldwell may have a point. 
In places such as Europe today, the Habermas–Ratzinger debate acquires utmost                     
relevance. A relevance not entirely insignificant for other parts of the West                       
either. It is against this background that I would like to submit some thoughts as                             
points of departure for further research. 
First a word about Habermas’ idea of the intercourse between secularism and                       
religion in the public sphere. Though the model itself is under discussion in its                           
many nuances, especially in the presence of a number of different cultures in                         
liberal societies, its principles appear as very sound. ‘Secularism’ as a way to                         
order the political community from an agnostic perspective promises the best                     
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arrangement known in order to make a democratic state work. ‘Secularism’ as a                         
worldview (laïcité) deserves a place in the public sphere, at the side of other                           
worldviews (religious or not), but does not have a right to claim a ‘monopoly of                             
culture’ that excludes other worldviews from the public sphere. 
Ratzinger cannot but endorse this view, only expounding on its usefulness to                       
‘purify’ and keep in check what in Europe and the West have been so far the core                                 
cultural traditions, namely Modernity and Christianity. There are examples on                   
how religions can and indeed have participated in the public sphere as part of                           
civil societies. 
The Catholic Church, for one, has attempted to contribute to public discussion​7 ​in                         
the last 120 years through papal ‘encyclical letters’ and other official Vatican                       
documents starting from Leo XIII’s (1893) Rerum novarum (on the condition of                       
labour) until Benedict XVI’s (2009) Charitas in veritate (on integral development),                     
including a Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church that came out in                           
2004. According to George Weigel (2003) the Catholic ‘social doctrine’ can be                       
summarised in four principles: personalism or the human rights principle,                   
which places the ‘inalienable dignity and value of the human person’ as                       
foundation of its understanding of politics and society; the principle of common                       
good (or communitarian principle); the principle of subsidiarity or of civil                     
society; and the principle of solidarity or of civic friendship (Weigel 2003:17-18). 
Other Christian churches participate in their own way – Evangelicals for                     
example as a prominent example in United States, Anglicans in the United                       
Kingdom and Australia, Orthodox in Eastern Europe, and so on –, not to speak of                             
the Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist​8​, Hindu, Confucianist and other traditions. Cultural                   
and religious traditions have a lot to contribute to society through participation                       
in the public sphere. They can be sources of wisdom and solidarity among                         
citizens. An awareness of this could help Europe to deal with its immigration,                         
especially when the newcomers possess a strong religious identity as is the case                         
of Muslims. 
Second thought. Does the constitutional democratic state need moral pre-                   
political foundations, a cultural background of some kind, common to all                     
citizens, that allows the polity to work or is the procedure that ensures success?                           
This is an empirical question that cannot be answered here. Some accounts seem                         
to suggest that there is a relationship between certain cultural backgrounds and                       
the development of successful liberal democracies. 
Caldwell (2009:159) affirms that ‘European secularism is set up with Christians in                       
mind. The concepts that arise out of Muslim communities are not identical’.                       
Huntington (2004) considers Christianity (especially under its Protestant banner)                 
an essential foundation of United States as a nation and responsible, together                       
with its English background, of its success as a democracy.​9 Molony (2005)                       
mentions Christianity – both in its Anglican and its Catholic branches - as part of                             
the cultural and moral foundations of Australia. And so does Bothwell (2006) for                         
the case of Canada. Virtually all member states in the European Union have                         
Christianity as a strong component of their culture, regardless of the number of                         
active adherents (Caldwell 2009). 
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 Habermas himself, though in explicit disagreement against the idea that the                     
constitutional state needs any pre-political cultural common ground, cannot                 
avoid to mention the ‘springs that well forth spontaneously – springs that one                         
may term “pre-political”’, found in civil society in which citizens are embedded.                       
Those pre- political energies motivate citizens to care not only about their own                         
individual interests, but also about the common good, and to practice the                       
political virtues that are ‘essential if a democracy is to exist’ (Habermas &                         
Ratzinger 2006:30-31). Even the very conception Habermas has of constitutional                   
patriotism is not completely free of cultural backgrounds: 
Despite a very common misunderstanding, “patriotism linked to the                 
constitution” means that the citizens wholeheartedly accept the principles of                   
the constitution, not only in their abstract substance, but very specifically out                       
of the historical context of the history of each nation. The cognitive process                         
on its own does not suffice, if the moral substance of basic rights is to                             
conquer the people’s attitudes… An abstract solidarity, mediated by the law,                     
arises among citizens only when the principles of justice have penetrated                     
more deeply into the complex of ethical orientations in a given culture                       
(Habermas & Ratzinger 2006:33-34). 
Of course, the question here is whether the values of the Enlightenment are                         
universal (therefore agreeable with potentially any cultural background) or if                   
they cannot be understood without the particular cultural background from                   
which they emerged. Admittedly, even if it can be shown that they emerged from                           
a specific cultural background, the conceptual possibility that they agree with                     
different cultures remains. This was Benazir Bhutto’s (2008:17-80) claim                 
regarding her religion, Islam, as committed ‘not only to tolerance and equality                       
but to the principles of democracy’​10​. 
But if it is true that the most advanced liberal democracies in the world – United                               
States, those in Western Europe, Canada or Australia for instance – do have a                           
pre-political component that everybody takes for granted (and therefore nobody                   
mentions explicitly) and informs the laws and the political life of the country,                         
then there is a strong case for that component to be investigated, specified,                         
acknowledged and preserved if liberal constitutional democracies wish to                 
continue to be such​11​. 
Western polities ought to open discussion about the culture that underlies their                       
beginnings and that has allowed them to become successful democracies. Once                     
they are recognised, they should make sure newcomers, even (or especially?)                     
those with different cultural backgrounds, learn about those values when they                     
arrive. 
Successful liberal democracies should be as open, tolerant and inclusive, as their                       
fundamental political core – and the culture sustaining it – is not broken. In                           
other words, they should not compromise their existence as successful liberal                     
democracies. This does not mean exclusion: it means clarity (for survival). Some                       
might see it as a sign of cultural arrogance: some others might see it as a                               
requirement of fairness to the ‘natives’ as well as to the newcomers – to the                             
natives, so that what they have built through generations can be kept; to the                           
newcomers, so that the benefits they are seeking when they immigrate continue                       
to exist. 
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This in Europe may mean, first of all, acknowledging the place of                       
Judeo-Christianity in its history and culture, something tremendously difficult to                   
do for the political class, if judged by the denial to even mention ‘God’ or                             
‘Christianity’ in the preamble of the constitutional treaty, when similar words or                       
even phrases exist in many constitutions of the member states (Weiler                     
2003:53-84). Less contested is, at least for the moment, the cultural place of                         
Modernity – the values of the Enlightenment – in the political culture of Europe​12​. 
As citizens whose cultural background rests on Islam and other religions find                       
explicit definition of the values that have made Europe what it is today and are                             
happy to abide by them, they, in turn, will be able to influence Europe’s public                             
life through their participation in the public sphere. Muslim Europeans might                     
have a slightly different opinion on their conception of Europe, if the ideas of                           
spiritual leaders such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi​13 ​(2010) are representative of their                     
views: 
Secularism may be accepted in a Christian society but it can never enjoy a                           
general acceptance in an Islamic society. Christianity is devoid of a shari`ah                       
or a comprehensive system of life to which its adherents should be                       
committed. The New Testament itself divides life into two parts: one for God,                         
or religion, the other for Caesar, or the state: "Render unto Caesar things                         
which belong to Caesar, and render unto God things which belong to God"                         
(Matthew 22:21). As such, a Christian could accept secularism without any                     
qualms of conscience (…) For Muslim societies, the acceptance of secularism                     
means something totally different; i.e. as Islam is a comprehensive system of                       
worship (`ibadah) and legislation (Shari`ah), the acceptance of secularism                 
means abandonment of Shari`ah, a denial of the divine guidance and a                       
rejection of Allah’s injunctions; It is indeed a false claim that Shariah is not                           
proper to the requirements of the present age. The acceptance of a                       
legislation formulated by humans means a preference of the humans’                   
limited knowledge and experiences to the divine guidance: "Say! Do you                     
know better than Allah?" (2:140). 
If and when they become the majority of the population in Europe they will have                             
the numbers (democratic majority) for a re-thinking of values and the                     
corresponding re-shaping of the European polity. Meanwhile, acknowledgement               
by native Europeans (and natives in other Western democracies for that                     
matter)​14 ​of what has allowed them to be what they are today does not mean that                               
they can not be open to immigration with different cultural backgrounds. It only                         
means that they will carry out that process, first of all, knowing what their own                             
culture is; and secondly, what elements in their own culture are essential and                         
which ones are dispensable in order to maintain successful democratic polities​15​.                     
This might then have effects not just on immigration and refugee policies, but                         
also on the ones addressed at the integration of residents in the changing                         
political community – European citizenship among them. 
Whether the constitutional state can be born and derive its legitimacy based only                         
on procedures and deliberation (to put it simply, ‘culture- free’) is still open to                           
debate. Certainly the procedures themselves can rely upon rules (the law) and a                         
defined form of participation (citizenship). At the same time, both the rules and                         
the citizens spring from a cultural context. The link between ‘Western’ cultural                       
background and successful liberal democracies can not be discarded as                   
irrelevant and ought to be explored. Such ‘background’ includes not only the                       
12 
 Enlightenment, but also the Judeo-Christian humus from which (and against                   
which) it sprung. This investigation will in turn shed light and ideas on how the                             
Western democratic constitutional state can approach and accommodate citizens                 
with strong and diverse cultural backgrounds. 
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Endnotes 
1 ​Centre for European Studies & Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics - Australian 
National University 
2 ​For an interesting study in comparative religions dealing with these problems see Ratzinger (2004). 
3 ​I have not seen studies focusing directly on this issue. The ‘Democracy Index’ 2008’ elaborated by 
The Economist Intelligence Unity classified as ‘full democracies’ thirty countries. With the exception 
of Japan, and partially of Mauritius and South Korea (both around 30% Christian), the other 27 
countries have a Christian background. Clearly, many countries with Christian background were 
not ​in that list. If we believe this study it would appear that Christianity is, therefore, neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition, though one likely to help a good outcome. This matter has to be 
further explored empirically, analytically and normatively. 
4 ​Which he explains in more detail in Habermas (2004). 
5 ​He assumes that voting cannot be compulsory, as is the case in Australia. 
6 ​The Nürenberg trials might be one. 
7 ​Often addressed not only to adherents, but also ‘to all man of goodwill’. 
8 ​In Burma and Tibet for example. 
9​ One does not need to endorse Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ approach to consider seriously 
his analysis. 
10 ​For all her effort to promote mutual knowledge and understanding between Islam and the West, 
she was aware of a battle for ‘the hearts and soul of Islam…between moderates and fanatics, 
between democrats and dictators, between those who live in the past and those who adapt to the 
present and plan for a better future’ (Bhutto, 2008:19-20). For her ‘in the resolution of this conflict 
may in fact lie the direction of international peace in the twenty-first century’ (Bhutto 2008:20). 
Unfortunately she did not live to see these developments. Extremists attempted (unsuccessfully) to 
assassinate her in October 2007 - 179 people died – and successfully in December 2007 – together 
with at least another 23 persons. 
11 ​Recognition of this cultural background would not necessarily imply that other potentially 
compatible combinations could be explored, for example between Islam and constitutional 
democratic values, as Bhutto and others have attempted. 
12 ​There is of course a clear push towards ‘post-modernity’ and ‘post-secularity’ but that has not 
undermined yet some general consensus about ‘modern values’ in liberal democracy. For 
interesting comments on this subject see Habermas & Mendieta (2010). 
13 ​According to ​Der Spiegel, ​‘one of the most influential contemporary Muslim scholars’. Through his 
Al- Jazeera talk show, ‘Sharia and Life’ along with his Web site ​Islam Online ​he reaches millions of 
people throughout the Muslim world. He is also a leading figure for millions of Muslims in Europe 
(Spiegel Online 2005). 
14 ​Today Australia has a Muslim population of around 2% according to figures of the Australian 
Government (DFAT 2006). The Australian (Neighbour 2010a) reported a few days ago an interview 
with Uthman Badar, spokesman of the Islamic organisation ​Hizb ut-Tahrir. ​According to Badar, 
Western democracy – now in fight with Islam – will collapse (as happened with the communist 
world). During a ​Hizb ut-Tahrir ​conference on the 4​th ​of July held in Sydney, British Islamist leader 
Burhan Hanif recommended Australian Muslims to shun secular democracy (Neighbour 2010b). 
15 ​The Australian citizenship test ​(Australian Citizenship, Our Common Bond ​2009:4), for instance, 
is 'designed to assess whether' applicants 'have an adequate knowledge of Australia', of 'the 
responsibilities and privileges of citizenship' and of English, the 'national language'. It teaches 
newcomers that Australia has a secular government, 'a Judeo-Christian heritage', and that 
'people in Australia are free to follow any religion they choose' or 'to not follow a religion' 
(Australian Citizenship, 
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